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The Construction of Privacy in and around The Bostonians
To start: a scene from The Bostonians. The transplanted
southerner Basil Ransom has returned to Boston from New York on a
business trip and decides to look up Verena Tarrant, whom he had
met the year before while visiting his cousin Olive Chancellor, a
reformer and advocate of women's rights. Basil knows that Olive
despises him for his conservative views, but even so, risks
stopping by with the hopes of locating Verena. Seeing instead the
old abolitionist Miss Birdseye leaving Olive's house, Basil gets
from her Verena's Cambridge address and elicits from her a promise
not to tell Olive that she had seen hirn. Believing in the "victory
of truth" and that Verena will convert Basil to their cause·
"privately," Miss Birdseye assents, "She will affect you! 1f
that's to be your secret, I will keep it" (B 227).
Proceeding to Cambridge, Basil finds Verena and goes with her
for a long walk through the Harvard campus. At a crucial moment
the question arises as to whether Verena will tell Olive of the
visite "How will she know," Basil asks, "unless you tell her?" (B
247). "I tell her everything," responds Verena (B 247), all the
while suggesting that she might after all keep the visit secret.
"WeIl, if I don't tell Olive, then you must leave me
here ," said Verena, stopping in the path and putting out a
hand of farewell.
"I don' tunderstand . What has that to do with it?
Besides I thought you said you must tell," Ransom added. In
playing with the subject this way, in enjoying her visible
hesitation, he was slightly conscious of a man's brutality-
-of being pushed by an impulse to test her good-nature, which
seemed to have no limit. It showed no sign of perturbation
as she answered:
"WeIl, I want to be free--to da as I think best. And,
if there is a chance of my keeping it back, there mustn't be
anything more--there must not, Mr. Ransom, really."
"Anything more? Why, what are you afraid there will be-
-if I should simply walk home with you?"
"I must go alone, I must hurry back to mother," she said,
for all reply. And she again put out her hand, which he had
not taken before.
Of course he took it now, and even held it amoment; he
didn't like being dismissed, and was thinking of pretexts to
linger. "Miss Birdseye said you would convert me, but you
haven't yet," it came into his head to say.'
Later we learn that Ransom's visit, "buried in unspoken, in
unspeakable, considerations," becomes, "the only secret [Verena]
had in theworld--the only thing that was all her own" (B 286-87).
staged around ahandshake -- the most common gesture standing
for the enactment of a contractual agreement -- this scene creates
a private space between Basil and Verena, giving to her a secret
that is her only possession in the world. In this essay I want to
examine the construction of aspace of privacy in The Bastanians,
especially the possibility for it under the terms set down by the
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marriage contract. But I want to do more. Even though frequently
we refer to privacy, it is not all that clear what we refer to when
we do. As the author of a legal text on the right of privacy
notes, "The word 'privacy' has taken on so many different meanings
and connotations in so many different legal and social contexts
that i t has largely ceased to convey any single coherent concept. ,,2
Or , as a book co-authored by the lawyer who defended Ulysses
against charges of obscenity puts i t, "The word 'privacy , has
different meanings for all of us. ,,3 The notion of privacy seems to
evoke private meanings. Given this confused sense of privacy,
there still might be some lessons to be learned from James' s
fictional construction of the private, even if we no longer accept
them as lessons from the master.
I
One reason for the legal confusion over privacy is that law
in the united states distinguishes between two kinds of privacy.
On the one hand, there is the so-called constitutional right of
privacy that protects against governmental actions. On the other,
there is the common law or tort right to privacy that protects
against actions by other private parties. The confusion is
heightened by the fact that the Constitution makes no mention of
a right of privacy, nor is one mentioned in the common law until
thelate nineteenth century when two American lawyers gave it a
rationale and a name. Constitutional privacy is in large measure
a creation of the Warren Court, especially Justice Douglas, who
argued that various amendments of the Bill of Rights contain
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"penumbras, " which, when taken together, create "zones of privacy"
into which the government should not intrude. 4 For instance, a
Constitutional right of privacy is the basis of Roe v. Wade, the
Supreme Court case that limits the government's power to interfere
with a woman' s choice to have an abortion or not. In contrast, the
common law right to privacy grows out of a Harvard Law Review essay
published in 1890. Its authors, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis,
like James, attended Harvard. Constructed out of his milieu and
at almost the same time that he was writing, this right to privacy
would seem to be the one most pertinent to his works.
Brandeis and Warren graduated first and second in their law
school class. Warren came from a wealthy Boston family. Brandeis
would become the first Jewish member of the Supreme Court.
Brandeis 's biographer quotes Roscoe Pound as saying that their
article did "nothing less than add a chapter to our law. ,,5 Its
intent was to protect human dignity from the prying of others.
They were especially concerned about abuses by the press.
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the
resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as weIl as effrontery.
To satisfy a prurienttaste the details of sexual relations
are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To
occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the
domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life,
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attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary
some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to pUblicity,
so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the
individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon his privacy, subjected hirn to mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily
injury.6
This hostility to the press has sparked imaginative accounts
of their article's origin. According to legend, Warren sought
Brandeis 's help in response to press coverage of his family' s
social life. In 1883 Warren married Miss Mabel Bayard, daughter
of Thomas Francis Bayard, Sr., a senator from Delaware who was
nearly nominated for president by the Democrats, although his
southern connections raised suspicion about him with some
northerners. As Secretary of State, Bayard forged a cooperative
alliance with Great Britain known as "hands across the Atlantic.,,7
It is only appropriate, then, that the famous writer of
transatlantic novels, Henry James, knew Bayard's daughter, having
met her on a visit to Washington, D.C. in 1882. Impressed by her
charm, he wrote to his mother that she and her friends were, "Such
as one ought to marry, if one were marrying. ,,8 James wasn' t
marrying, but a year later Mabel was. According to one of
Brandeis's biographers, the Warrens "set up housekeeping in
Boston's exclusive Back Bay section and began to entertain
elaborately. The Saturday Evening Gazette, which specialized in
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'blue blood items,' naturally reported their activities in lurid
detail. ,,9 Reporters, we are told, snuck into social affairs as
waiters, carrying hidden cameras: For six years, according to the
authors of a book on privacy, Warren and Brandeis considered legal
means to halt such intrusions, using that time meticulously to
arrange "the words that convey the ideas that constitute [their]
argument. ,,10
Recently this account of the article ' s origins has been
disputed. Unearthing very few reports of the Warrens ' social life,
less sympathetic scholars speculate that the actual cause of
Warren 's outrage was the handling of Senator Bayard in 1889. 11 But
whether the image of Samuel Warren knocking a camera out of a
disguised reporter's hands is a fabrication or not, it is clear
that many of the so-called "best men" of the time were concerned
about the intrusiveness of the press. For instance, Warren and
Brandeis cite a Scribner's article written the same year by E.L.
Godkin, the editor of The Nation. Godkin argues that the threat
to privacy grows out of the development of new technologies of
pUblicity. Admitting that there is "some substance" to the claim
that "the love of gossip is after all human," he adds
But as long as gossip was oral, it spread, as regarded any one
individual, over a very small area, and was confined to the
immediate circle of his acquaintances. It did not reach, or
but rarely reached, those who knew nothing of him. It did not
make his name, or his walk, or his conversation familiar to
strangers. And what is more to the purpose , i t spared him the
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pain or mortification of knowing that he was gossiped about.
A man seldom heard of oral gossip about hirn which simply made
hirn ridiculous, or trespassed on his lawful privacy, but made
no positive attack on his reputation. His peace and comfort
were, therefore, but slightly affected by it.
Not only does the wide circulation of papers reveal someone' s
imperfections to people hundreds or thousands of miles away, worst
of all it "brings to his knowledge exactly what is said about him,
with all of its details." Thus he must suffer "the great pain of
feeling that everybody he meets in the street is perfectly familiar
with some folly, or misfortune, or indiscretion, or weakness, which
he had previously supposed had never got beyond his domestic
circle. ,,12
James was obviously intrigued by the power of the press to
cause such affronts to personal dignity. For instance, a major
part of his 1888 novel, The Reverberator, describes how a vulgar
American reporter almost halts the marriage of a sophisticated
French-American man to an innocent American woman when he publishes
information that he obtains from her. The information is about the
private life of her family-to-be, which, in turn, considers anyone
who would give such information to areporter unworthy of
membership in its exclusive circle. James's plot indicates that,
whether or not we can trust a biographer's account about
journalistic accounts of the private life of the Warren family,
Warren and Brandeis had available vivid, if fictional, accounts of
just how unscrupulous the press could be in its reporting. Their
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concern was not with libel. That was already covered by the law.
Instead, they wanted to guarantee legal protection against the sort
of intrusions that James imagines, whether the information was true
or not. 13 They sought this protection by claiming that, although
it had never been articulated, the common law guaranteed a right
to privacy or, as they put it, "the right 'to be left alone' ."14
The political consequences of such a right to privacy in our
own day are not at all clear. A number of liberals point to its
Mugwump origins to confirm their conviction that it is a relic of
an elitist, bourgeois ideology. For evidence they could point to
an 1890 editorial in The Nation commenting on the Warren and
Brandeis article. While deploring violations of privacy , the
author is pessimistic about providing for i ts protection. One
reason that he cites is that "In all democratic societies today
the public is disposed either to resent attempts at privacy, either
of mind or body, or turn them into ridicule. ,,15 To defend privacy
seems, in other words, undemocratic. Shortly thereafter, however,
an editorial in Scribner's Magazine takes issue with this account.
"It is important to note, " it insists, "that privacy is not by any
means an attribute of aristocracy as opposed to democracy."
Nonetheless, the Scribner's article only fuels the fire ef these
who find the defense of privacy conservative. It begins: "In the
great future battle of the world between the two systems of
Socialism and Individualism, one of the vital points ef difference
is to be privacy. ,,16
But if late nineteenth-century capitalists linked the threat
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to privacy to socialism, today some capitalists decry a right to
privacy while some radicals cry out for it. For instance, the
radical feminist Andrea Dworkin is incensed with the recent New
York Times and NBC News policy of reporting the names of rape
victims. "If a woman's reporting a rape to the police means she
will be exposed by the media to the scrutiny of voyeurs and worse,
a sexual spectacle with her legs splayed open in the public mind,
reporting itself will be tantamount to suicide." Like Warren and
Brandeis years earlier, Dworkin considers the truth of the
reporting irrelevant. "The media," she says, fluse you until they
use you up." What the rape victim needs, she argues, sounding very
much like our Mugwumps, is "privacy, dignity, lack of fear." 17
In contrast to Dworkin, we have Judge Richard Posner' s
pronouncements on privacy. It is hard to fit os~er's complicated
thinking under simple labels, but he is certainly not a socialist.
He is, however, extremely critical of a tort right to privacy.
Very few people want to be left alone. They want to
manipulate the world around them by selective disclosure of
facts about themselves. . . . Reputation is what others think
of us, and we have no right to control other people' s
thoughts. Equally we have no .right, by controlling the
information that is known about us, to manipulate the opinions
that other people hold of us. Yet this is the essence of what
most students of the sUbject mean by privacy.18
Posner's stand on privacy is consistent with that aspect of
his thought that makes hirn an economic conservative: he is a
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staunch defender of the freedom of the market. Thus he disagrees
with Warren and Brandeis's attempt to provide legal protection for
those who wanted to keep information about themselves, true or not,
from circulation in the market. Posner would seem to agree with
)
the reporter in The Reverberator that such information belongs to
the public. Any consideration of the political effect of a right
to privacy should take into account Warren and Brandeis's attempt
to resist the logic of the market.
The attempt to have the right to privacy resist the logic of
the market forced the two lawyers to distinguish privacy from
property rights. The attempt to disassociate a right from rights
of property in the united states in the late nineteenth century
might at first glance seem a foolish move. After all, labor
leaders and political radicals decried the legal privileges granted
to the propertied and declared that the major social conflict was
one between the interests of workers and the interests of property.
But, as legal historians point out, this was not the age of
property in the law but the age of contract. 19 The law may have
protected vested interests of propertYi nonetheless, the value of
property was subordinate to the contract relation. Whereas in the
eighteenth century there was a general tendency to assume the
intrinsic value of a piece of property, in the highly developed
market economy of the late nineteenth century value was determined
by contractual exchanges in the marketplace. The consequences of
the reign of contract for the attempts to guarantee a right to
privacy are best understood if we remember Locke's crucial
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distinction between life and labor. For Locke labor is alienable
from the person and thus becomes a form of property. Life,
however, is not alienable. To subordinate the right to privacy to
that of property is to make it alienable. But the entire point of
a right to privacy is to protect aspects of the personality from
circulation in the marketplace. Privacy, therefore, had to be
related to an inalienable part of one's persona1ity.
One way of looking at the history of the tort right to privacy
is to note how difficult it has been to disassociate it from
property.20 For an example, we can turn to Godkin' s argument about
reputation. Reputation, Godkin argues, is one of man' s most
valuable possessions , as important or more important for the
comfort and happiness of life as "tangible property. 11 As he quotes
Shakespeare:
Who steals my purse steals trashi 'tis something, nothingi
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousandsi
But he that felches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches hirn,
And makes me poor indeed __21
But even though Godkin insists on reputation as being more valuable
than money, the courts protected reputation by linking it to
tangible property. Because reputation could increase earning
power, it, like labor, was a form of property. For instance, one
of Albion W. Tourgee's most ingenious attacks on the separate but
equal law challenged in Plessy v. Ferguson was that, in labelling
Homer Plessy, who was seven eights white, black, the Jim Crow law
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deprived him of his reputation as a white man, which affected his
earning power and consequently violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of life, liberty, and property. The Supreme Court did
not deny Tourgee's argument that reputation was a form of propertYi
i t merely denied the relevancy of his argument to the law in
question.
If reputation itself is marketable, how can it be an
inalienable part of someone's pe~sonality? Indeed, the seeming
inability completely to disassociate the right to privacy from
property would seem to point to the folly of arguments like Warren
and Brandeis's that appeal to the notion of an "inviolate
personality" capable of resisting the market. As a generation of
literary critics has been trained to believe, the very notion of
an inviolate, private self is a construct. Students of late
nineteenth-century United States culture have used this insight to
suggest that far from resisting the logic of the market, the notion
of an inviolate, private self is a product of it. For instance,
Philip Fisher problematizes the opposition between public and
private by arguing that in The Bostonians the private self does not
preexist the public but is created by disappearing from it. The
"genius" of James's novel he asserts, "is not to ask the question
of how, out of normal human materials" a performing public self is
constructed. "Instead he begins with Verena' s instinctively public
self and asks how, out of this, an intimate and human-scale
personality might be won." Verena I s "full possession of an
individual self," he argues, comes from her final act of
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disappearing from the public. 22
Providing a new historicist twist to Laurence Holland's
argument about the expense of vision in James's work,23 Fisher's
reading would seem to complicate a genteel, Mugwump vision of a
private, autonomous self that pre-exists the realm of pUblicity.
It is worth noting, however, that the Mugwump vision was not quite
as essentialist as contemporary critics make it out to be. For
Gilder a private self is not an ahistorical self. "Privacy," he
maintains, "is a distinctly modern product, one of the luxuries of
civilization, which is not only unsought for but unknown in
primitive or barbarous societies. ,,24 Even if we are put off by
Gilder's Eurocentric views of civilization and barbarism, we have
to acknowledge that they make clear that for him a private self is
not some pre-given, natural self, but one that is produced by a
particular civilization, a self that he feels is weIl worth
preserving. Likewise, the purpose of Warren and Brandeis 's article
was to demonstrate that the common law is a historically adaptable
institution that contains within i t the principles to provide legal
protection against new threats to a particular version of the self.
Present commentators almost always overlook the fact that Warren
and Brandeis refer to a right to privacy, not a right of privacy,
which is the common phrase today. They shouldn't. The difference
is subtle, but a right to privacy is more appropriate for a right
to be left alone that carries with it the implication that unless
it is guaranteed an inviolate personality will be impossible to
maintain, whereas a right of privacy, a bit more strongly, implies
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something that an inviolate personality has as an inalienable
possession. A right to privacy is more a creation of the law, a
right of privacy more an appeal to natural rights.
My point is that Warren and Brandeis come closer than some
give them credit for to Robert Post's very contemporary argument
that the issue at stake concerning privacy "is not whether the law
ought to protect personality, but rather how the law ought to
conceptualize personality for the purposes of legal protection. ,,25
The Mugwumps conceptualized personality in a very particular way
and feIt that it should be protected. What is interesting when we
look at James in conjunction with their concept of personality is
that he too asserts a notion of personality, but one that
problematizes the Mugwump version. In problematizing it he does
not, however, reduce it to a pure product of the public sphere or
the market. The private self in James does respond to new market
conditions and new techniques of pUblicity. But even though those
forces shape the nature of the self, they do not completely
determine its shape.
The problem with a reading like Fisher's is that it corrects
the notion that a private self preexists a public realm by turning
the relationship upside down. James's novel works by a "reversal
of terms." He underlines a "strategy of self-creation that inverts
the strategy of pUblicity and visibility that are the machinery of
the celebrity" (my emphasis). 26 The private is formed by
disappearing from what must be a preexisting public realm. The
legal distinction between the Constitutional and tort rights of
14
privacy points to the flaw in such an inversion. To recall,
Constitutional privacy is concerned with violations of privacy by
the governmenti tort privacy with violations by other private
parties. If privacy can be violated by private parties, we cannot
rest content with a simple opposition between public and private.
Instead, we need to distinguish between different realms of the
private. 27 For instance, whereas i t seems to make sense to contrast
the private self to the "public" realm of the market, in the late
nineteenth century the market was very much considered apart of
the private realm. After all, a main principle of laissez-faire
economics was that the public realm of government should not
interfere with private business contracts between free
individuals. 28 But even if we grant that the realm of the market
was for the most part considered private rather than public, it
still makes sense to consider the market less private than the
domestic sphere into which Verena disappears at the end of The
Bostonians. It is the almost sacred realm of the domestic circle
that Warren and Brandeis and Gilder seem most concerned to protect.
They share that concern with Justice Douglas, who in Griswold v.
Connecticut appealed to the sanctity of the domestic circle to
uphold the right of a married couple to use contraceptives. Waxing
eloquently he asks:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for teIltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. We deal with
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a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. 29
The domestic circle may be considered by many of us the most
sacred zone of privacy, but, as Douglas's quotation makes clear,
it is not an asocial realm. Indeed, at the heart of the domestic
circle is a contractual relation, that between husband and wife.
The nature of that contract complicates any exploration into the
notion of privacy.
II
The marriage contract, lawyers in the late nineteenth century
willingly granted, is a special sort of contract. In an 1867 essay
Godkin favorably evoked Sir Henry Maine who argued that the
"movement of the progressive societies has . been a movement
from status to Contract. ,,30 Casting off feudal relations based on
status , progressive societies were founded on contractual relations
of free and equal individuals. Honoring the "freedom" of contract
as no society before it, the united states in the late nineteenth
century could claim to be the most progressive of progressive
societies. But the marriage contract raises an important problem.
Involving two mutually consenting adults, it, nonetheless, creates
a relationship of status, a relationship that the united states
Supreme Court called "the foundation of the family and of
society. ,,31 A society supposedly founded on freedom of contract,
in fact, had an equally important foundation in a domestic relation
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of status.
Because the social order depends upon the proper ordering of
the private domestic realm, the contract creating that space has
a quasi-public nature. Thus, in an age in which the courts
considered interference with market transactions an unwarranted
violation of the freedom of contract, they asserted their right to
regulate the marriage contract. Divorce, for instance, was not
simply a matter of two individuals who could freely enter into or
out of a contractual relation. As Justice Thomas M. Cooley of
Michigan wrote, "There are three parties to every divorce
proceeding, the husband, the wife, and the state; the first two
parties representing their respective interests as individuals; the
state concerned to guard the morals of its citizens, by taking care
that neither by collusion nor otherwise, shall divorce be allowed
under circumstance as to reduce marriage to a mere temporary
arrangement of conscience or passion . . . . "32
Cooley is most famous for his Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the states of
the American Union (1868), often appealed to by defenders of
laissez-faire economics. But although he was very reluctant to
interfere with the terms of business contracts betweenprivate
citizens, he, like most of his generation, believed in governmental
regulation of the marriage contract. Cooley is also the person who
provided Warren and Brandeis with their crucial phrase, "the right
'to be left alone I • "33
Cooley was willing to have the state regulate the marriage
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contract because social health depended upon the proper ordering
of the domestic sphere. Once the state guaranteed that husband and
wife assumed their proper status, however, the state's regulatory
function more or less ceased, and the domestic circle became a
sanctified private realm supposedly immune to public and private
interference. This did not mean that regulation of the domestic
~phere ceased. Its regulation, however, was left up to husband and
wife who were expected to perform their proper duties, duties that
established a clear-cut legal hierarchy in their relationship.
As same critics of traditional marriage pointed out, the
courts' attitude toward marriage was similar to the attitude
southern courts had adopted toward slavery. In both cases, courts
tried to guarantee a proper relation of status but refused to
interfere with it once it was established. For instance, Basil
Ransom grew up in a society that classified master and slave and
husband and wife as parallel parts of the law of domestic
relations. 34 The end of slavery did not mean the end of the courts'
treatment of marriage in the same way. In fact, emancipation
fueled fears of miscegenation, which led to powerful assertions of
the government' s right to regulate the terms of the marriage
contract. For instance, in adecision that declared homes the
"nurseries of the states," an Alabama court dissolved an
interracial marriage. Who, it wondered, can "estimate the evil of
introducing into the most intimate relations, elements so
heterogeneous that they must naturally cause discord, shame,
disruption of family circles, and estrangements of kindred? While
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with the~r interior administration, the state should interfere but
little, it is obviously of the highest public concern that it
should, by general laws adapted to the state of things around them,
guard against disturbances from without. ,,35
Because the domestic circle had such an important social role
it was established by a contract much more public in nature than
the business contract. This public contract created a sacred
sphere that should not be violated by public or private parties.
Private as that sphere might seem, however, it was not a sphere in
which husband and wife could legally assert "the right to be left
alone" against one another. On the contrary, the marriage contract
created one legal body out of two. James's works can help us sort
out the complications that the marriage contract presented to
notions of a private personality. It's time, then, to return to
The Bostonians.
III
The relationship established between Verena and Basil in
Cambridge is defined by two very different contrasts. One is
between their encounter and the location in which it begins to take
shape. Their intimacy is first established in Memorial Hall at
Harvard, a semi-public space commemorating the private deaths of
the "sons of the university" who gave their lives in public service
during the civil War. As James puts it, "They were discussing
their affairs, which had nothing to do with the heroic symbols that
surrounded themi but their affairs had suddenly grown so serious
that there was no want of decency in their lingering there for the
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purpose" (B 247).
The other contrast is between their relationship and the one
that Verena has with Olive. Because Verena ends up promising to
marry Basil, most critics assume that the relationship between the
two women stands for an alternative to traditional marriage. To
a certain extent this is true, since traditional marriage is
heterosexual. Indeed, the status that the marriage contract
constructed between husband and wife was justified on the basis of
th,e "natural" forces of heterosexuality. But if James presents an
alternative to traditional marriage by eliminating the forces of
heterosexuality from Olive and Verena's relationship, the
~lternative that he presents experiments with the ideal of marriage
put forth by many feminists of the period. Only a minority of
those advocating women' s rights clamored for the abolition of
marriage. Most continued to support the notion of marriage as a
sacred union of mutual consent and a balance of mutual obligations
and duties. What concerned them was that the relationship of
status created by the marriage contract did not allow a
relationship of equality. In the relationship between Verena and
Olive James experiments with the possibility of achieving that
ideal without what many in his generation considered a natural
barrier toits fulfillment: heterosexuality.36
Many contemporary critics look at Olive's feminism and assume
that she opposes the institution of marriage. To be sure, she
would "hate it for herself" (B 105). But that hatred has more to
do with the fact that marriage for her was possible only with a
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man. Indeed, Verena' s initial radical disapproval of the marriage-
tie "gave her a vertigo" (B 105). She especially "didn't like the
'atmosphere' of circles in which such institutions were called into
question" (B 105). Unlike Verena, she is not an advocate of "free
union" (B 105). Quite traditional in her views, she idealizes a
relationship that requires renunciation. What distinguishes her
from traditional advocates of marriage is that she wants a
relationship with Verena that renounces the heterosexual attraction
that supposedly shaped the status granted male and female by the
marriage contract.
As Olive acknowledges, the "union of soul" (B 101) that she
seeks with Verena would take a "double consent" (B 101). Based on
mutual consent, their relationship creates a "partnership of their
two minds" (B 169). That partnership is not, however, based on
radical notions of "free union" (B 105) in which the partners are
free to dissolve it at will. Instead, Olive seeks, as in a
marriage contract, a promise that "would bind them together for
life" (B 129). That she seeks from Verena a promise not to marry
would seem to undercut my claim that James uses their relationship
to experiment with the possibility of a truly egalitarian
"marriage." But her subsequent refusal to accept Verena's spoken
promise when it is offered, preferring to "trust" her "without a
pledge" (B 152), serves to emphasize the way in which their
relationship approaches the ideal of a union between two people
more closely than the existing marriage contract. The marriage
contract, after all, depends on legal sanctionto enforce i ts
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lifelong bond. Verena and Olive' s bond demands a perpetual renewal
based on mutual trust. Coming together in a partnership that
compensated for the lack each one possessed, they form an "organic
whole" (B 169).
Verena and Olive's success in creating one body out of two is
in stark contrast to Basil's lone attempt to form a partnership.
Having difficulty making ends meet as a southern lawyer in New York
city, "he had formed a partnership with a person who seemed likely
to repair some of his deficiencies--a young man from Rhode Island,
acquainted, according to his own expression, with the inside track"
(B 197) . 37 Rather than compensate for Basil' s deficiencies -- one
of which was capital -- his new partner took what little money the
partnership had and snuck off for Europe.
As successful as Verena and Olive's partnership is by
contrast, its very success allows James to suggest an indirect
criticism of the institution of marriage that Olive herself is not
willing to make. If Verena and Olive's union creates an organic
body that compensates for their respective deficiencies, what it
lacks, as we have seen, is aspace for Verena to call her own. The
problem is not simply, as some critics pose i t, that Verena' s
relationship with Olive grants her a public role, whereas her
relationship with Basil confines her to a private one. To be sure,
Verena and Olive work together to present a voice to the public,
whereas Basil will deny Verena that voice. Nonetheless, both offer
her a private, domestic life. Olive, though opposed to marriage
for herself, is extremely domestic. On his first visit to her,
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Basil is most struck by the tasteful arrangement of his cousin's
horne. Like the proper wife, "Olive Chancellor regulated her
conduct on lofty principles" (B 52). "Her house," we are told,
"had always been thoroughly weIl regulated" (B 184). This domestic
regulation is one of the most important things that Olive offers
to Verena, who comes from a most unregulated family.38 But even
though such regulation heightens her cultural refinement, it leaves
her with no space of her own.
This is not to say that at the end of the novel she will find
it with Basil. James is highly conscious of how the private sphere
of the domestic circle creates arealm in which individual privacy
is hard to come by. This, indeed, is part of the message of The
Reverberator. It is easy to read that work as James's attack on
the press' intrusion into the private realm of the domestic circle.
But James also directs his satire against the proper French-
American family, the "house of Probert," that is held together by
a delicate "bond" that makes "each for all and all for each" (R 68-
9). Acting as a corporate body, it would forbid son and brother
Gastonto marry a lovely, but unrefined, American, who in her
innocence betrays family secrets to the press. Family secrets is
the right phrase, for everyone in the family knows about them. As
imagined by James, this family is so close that no secrets are
allowed, although a lot of hypocrisy is. For instance, the family
seems willing to relent in its jUdgment of Francie, if she would
only lie and say that she was forced into confiding to the
journalist. But innocent Francie insists on the truth, forcing
23
Gaston to choose between his family and his lover. In a crucial
scene, his friend, an American artist, advises hirn to marry, "To
save from destruction the last scrap of your independence" (R 205) .
Gaston 's family, he teIls hirn, is rendering hirn "incapable of
individual life" (R 205). Gaston ends up proving his independence
by choosing to marry, but, in a typical Jarnesian move, that choice
creates the conditions for yet another domestic circle. Similarly,
in The Bostonians Verena escapes from one domestic relation into
another.
In most respects her relationship with Basil promises to be
even more confining than her relationship with Olive. In addition
to being predicated on her willingness to hold "her tongue" (B 256)
and to no longer speak in public, her relation to Basil introduces
the force of sexuality into Verena's life, a force that makes it
impossible to maintain the delicate balance of equality for which
Olive and Verena strive. Indeed, the holding of Verena's tongue
and the force of male sexuality are linked early in the book when
Olive warns her, "There are gentlemen in plenty who would be glad
to stop your mouth by kissing it" (B 151).
The image of Verena's mouth being stopped by a kiss invites
direct comparison with the scene between Basil and Verena in
Cambridge. If that scene culminates in ahandshake, the act most
symbolic of contractual relations between equal partners, the kiss
is the act most symbolic of sealing the contract between man and
wife. The nature of Verena's life in marriage is anticipated by
the imagery of the final scene. Wrenching Verena from Olive "by
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muscular force" (B 432), Ransom thrusts the "hood of Verena' s long
cloak over her head to conceal her face and identity" (B 433). No
wonder that the union she is about to enter promises to produce
more tears than the ones she sheds at that moment.
As Lynn Wardleyhas pointed out, Verena's marriage with Basil
does not, as Fisher would have it, signal the end of her performing
self for a private self, since Verena will continue to perform.
The difference is that she will now perform with Basil as her
private audience. 39 She has not disappeared from the public realm
to assert the "full possession of an individual self," because the
domestic sphere she is about to enter, while decidedly private,
will not allow her the space for a self to exist. Indeed, the
marriage contract incorporates her into the body of her husband.
The book's ending does not mean, however, that James offers
no space whatsoever for a private self to be constructed. Such a
space occurs, even if momentarily, during the handshake between
Verena and Basil.
IV
Like the kiss about which Olive warns Verena, Verena' s
handshakewith Basil leads to a holding of her tongue. But whereas
the kiss would put an end to her addresses to the public so as to
reserve them for Basil, the handshake implies that she will keep
her meeting with Basil secret from Olive, another private party.
Furthermore, she does not submit to her silence, but offers it on
the condition that Basil leave her aspace of her own. If offering
her hand seals a moment of intimacy between her and Basil, it also
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established boundaries between them. "'WeIl, if I don't tell
Olive, then you must leave me here,' said Verena, stopplng in the
path and putting out a hand of farewell" (B 248). To be sure, at
first Basil refuses to enter into the agreement she offers. He
even momentarily enj oys playing with her and testing her good
nature while being "slightly conscious of a man' s brutality" (B
248). But Verena's resistance continues, working to control the
natural brutality that would force itself upon her. "WeIl, I want
to be free--to do as I think best. And, if there is a chance of
my keeping it back, there mustn't be anything more--there must not,
Mr. Ransom, really" (B 248).
Of course, Verena' s desire to be "free" can be read ironically
in light of the book' sending. Far from offering her freedom, this
moment can be read as leading to her subsequent submission to
Basil's masculine will. Nonetheless, at this moment a delicate
balance is reached; a balance achieved when Basil, despite
irritation at "being dismissed" (B 248), takes the hand she once
again offers. In James's world aspace in which a private self can
take shape is constructed in such a balanced moment.
The nature of that moment can be appreciated by comparing it
to perhaps the most famous moment in American literature
sanctifying a private relationship between a man and a woman: the
meeting of Hester and Dimmesdale in The Scarlet Letter. Whereas
Hawthorne's lovers meet in the forest, James's, as we have seen,
meet in a semi-public realm. Part of the sanctity of their moment
together results from the sanctity of that semi-public space, not
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their withdrawal into nature. Furthermore, whereas Hester and
Dimmesdale share privacy because of their illicit sexual union,
Verena and Basil create the possibilities of privacy through the
establishment of boundaries. As Olive puts it trying to wrench
Verena's secret from her later in the novel, "Verena Tarrant, what
is there between you?" (B 362). A private personality for James
does not result from protecting a self that preexists social
relations. Nor does it result from the union of two selves into
one that underlies the so-called sanctity of the domestic sphere.
It does not even result from disappearance from the pUblic.
Instead, it has to do with the creation of aspace between, aspace
that establishes connection while simultaneously helping to define
the parties involved as individuals.
What complicates the establishment of this space between in
James is that it depends upon an empty space within the two parties
involved. We can see this most obviously with Verena.
Verena's remarkable capacity to establish relationships with
people results not from a fullness, but an emptiness, "the
extraordinary generosity with which she could expose herself, give
herself away, turn herself inside out, for the satisfaction of a
person who made demands of her" (B 370). Her role as medium is her
most obvious manifestation of this "generosity. ,,40 She seems
capable of speaking the voice of whomever is in control of her.
Her generosity suggests that James has merely given her the
traditional definition of a woman as an empty vessel, waiting to
be filled and given identity by her union with a man. For
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instance, during his first encounter with her, Basil comes close
to "attributing to Miss Tarrant a singular hollowness of character"
(B 85). But the hollowness that defines Verena' s essence turns out
to inhabit other characters as weIl. It is, after all,
deficiencies, not a fullness, that cause Basil, Verena, and Olive
to seek out partnerships. Furthermore, if Verena's voice seems
capable of being taken possession by whomever she is around, it is
that very voice that seduces Basil, penetrating the core of his
being so that he, in turn, wants to take sole possession of it.
Taking possession of another is as much a cardinal sin for
James as it is for Hawthorne. Unlike Hawthorne, however, he does
not imagine an alternative to it to be a full moment of organic
unity. In contrast, James's alternative balances the generosity
that he associates with Verena against the resistance that she
displays in her handshake with Basil. Owing much to the ideal of
the period's market exchanges, that balanced vision also points to
its limits.
The ideological power of contract as a mode of exchange
depends upon an image of balance, an image of two free and equal
parties willingly consenting to a transaction from which both can
benefit. What needs to be stressed, however, is that in the
business contract this image rules out the possibility of truly
interpersonal exchanges. This is because, whereas the exchange
ideally leads to financial profit for both involved, it concerns
alienable property, not the essence of the people themselves.
Accumulated property can be merely added onto an already existing
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self.
James's image of exchanges is quite different. For James no
essential self exists outside of exchanges and yet precisely for
that reason all exchanges are interpersonal and thus affect the
very nature of the self. This is because, as we have seen, a self
cannot achieve definition without a "space between" that only
interpersonal relations can provide, while, at the same time,
interpersonal relations are impossible without an emptiness within
the self, an emptiness making one vulnerable to penetrations -- and
dominations -- by another. This image of exchange leads to a very
different account of how business contracts lead to profit.
Rather than present a world in which a balanced agreement
between equal partners can lead to mutual profit -- as Basil hoped
for in forming his law partnership -- James presents a world in
which profit results from imbalances, dominations, and submissions.
Even in those transactions in which both parties reap a financial
gain, for James, a personal loss is involved. Indeed, rather than
assume that the basis of a contract is a preexisting balance
between bargaining partners whose agreement signals a meeting of
the wills, James shows that a balance can be achieved only, as
Verena temporarily does, through the resistance of one party to the
will of another.
This vision puts hirn at odds with many of the most outspoken
critics of the marriage contract of his day but not because he
is an apologist for marriage. I have already pointed out how Olive
shares the belief of some feminists, who continued to consider
29
marriage a sacred bond but were intent on making it more
egalitarian. Other, more radical, advocates of marital reform
turned to a belief in freedom of contract to remedy the status
relation created by the marriage contract. For instance, there is
free love advocate and first female Wall Street broker victoria
Woodhull whom James used for a model in "The Siege of London."
Woodhull proclaimed that in marriage, "There is neither right nor
duty beyond the uniting -- the contracting -- individuals.,,41 If
husbands and wives could only be considered free and equal
contracting parties, like those entering into a business contract,
the institution of marriage would be reformed. James offers a
different vision. Unlike Locke who feIt that someone could enter
into exchanges and alienate property (or labor as a form of
property) without affecting an essential, inalienable self, James
presents a self that is defined by the exchanges into which it
enters, just as the marriage contract alters the status of the
contracting parties. As a result, rather than use the ideal of the
business contract as a model to reform the marriage contract, he
uses the imbalances that critics noted in the marriage contract to
suggest that such imbalances inhabit all exchangesi that all, like
the marriage contract, involve imbalanced structures of the status
of the person that they in part construct. Nonetheless, within
this framework -- there was no other available to him -- James does
present an exchange that achieves a momentary balance as Basil and
Verena, in shaking hands, create aspace between themselves, a
space that both constructs and -- so long as it exists -- helps to
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maintain a private self otherwise denied Verena.
V
The moment of privacy constructed between Verena and Basil in
this scene helps us to understand another contract that James tries
to negotiate in his works; that between reader and text. I want
to turn the terms of that contract in such a way so as to address
two recent charges levelled against James. The first is the
complaint by some feminists that he denies Verena any possible
autonomy.42 The second that he is a champion of a discredited
notion of artistic autonomy. My response to these complaints is
linked. Yes, James does deny Verena autonomy, but he also
explicitly compares her to a work of art. Since few would deny
that James regards art very highly, it follows that James's denial
of autonomy to Verena should not be seen negatively. It also
follows that James does not champion artistic autonomy. What he
does champion, I would claim, is artistic "privacy."
The most important link between Verena and a work of art is
her capacity to be simultaneously vulnerable and seductive. Her
seductiveness comes from her charm, which for Mrs. Burrage gives
her the appearance of an autonomous work of art whose originality
creates its own value. "When a girl is as charming, as original,
as Miss Tarrant, it doesn't in the least matter who she iSi she
makes herself the standard by which you measure her; she makes her
own position" (B 303). But, as we have seen, Verena's
"originality" derives, not from her autonomy, but from a hollowness
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at her core that makes her dependent upon relations. That
dependency, in turn, makes her the most fascinating figure in the
book. She may not drive the plot, but i t is generated by her
"generosity." Making her vulnerable to possession by those around
her, this generosity also opens her to life. For instance, on the
beautiful spring day that Basil visits her in New York, Olive
leaves them alone and walks along the streets "barely conscious of
the loveliness of the day, the perfect weather, all suffused and
tinted with spring" (B 299). In contrast, although Verena is at
first nervous about her walk with Basil, once she "was fairly
launched the spirit of the day took possession of her" (B 319).~
The openness that makes Verena vulnerable to possession also
accounts for her seductive and original charm. Both her
vUlnerability and seductiveness are in turn related to her voice.
Neither Olive nor Basil are originally attracted to the ideas that
she expresses. Olive, as we have seen, is repulsed by her notions
of free union; Basil by almost everything. As he teIls Miss
Birdseye, "Does a woman consist of nothing but her opinions? I
like Miss Tarrant's lovely face to begin with" (B 226). Verena's
ideas, it seems, are alienable from Verena's body. And more than
from her body, from her voice. Completely charmed by her voice as
she performs in New York, Basil takes for granted that "the matter
of her speech was ridiculous. . . . She was none the less charming
for that, and the moonshine she had been plied with was none the
less moonshine for her being charming" (B 266). Indeed, it is
Verena' s voice that proves so seductive. Its power is economically
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expressed when Ransom overhears her practicing her speech for the
Music Hall, "Murder, " he exclaims, "what a lovely voice!" (B 348).
So murderous is its power that Basil would virtually murder to
possess it. As he waits to steal her away at the end of the book,
he could imagine how a young man "waiting in a public place" might
feel, who "has made up his mind, for reasons of his own, to
discharge a pistol at the king or the president" (B 348). For
Basil, Verena's voice, not her opinions, represents her
"character." As he teIls Mrs. Luna, Olive's sister, "You like me
for my opinions, but entertain a different sentiment for my
character. I deplore Miss Tarrant's opinions, but her character-
-weIl, her character pleases me" (B 407).
But lest we think that in James's world only the ideas of
wamen seem alienable from the voice that stands for their
character, it is important to remember that Verena also separates
her attraction to Basil from his opinions. Challenged by Olive
abaut her attraction to a former slave owner, she with "majesty"
responds, "I don't loathe him--I only dislike his opinions"
(B 363). Just as Basil is seduced by Verena' s voice, so she
marvels at "how wonderfully he can talk" (B 368). The "speIl" that
each casts on the other, like the speIl that works of art cast on
their aUdiences, cannot be explained by mere reference to ideas and
argument.
The separability of a work or a character from its ideas may
seem to return us to a doctrine of individual autonomy, for it
implies that there is some mysterious essence to both work and
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character that cannot be reduced to their ideas. Eliot, for
instance, praised James for having a mind so fine that no idea can
violate it, and his obvious distrust of novels of ideas is one
reason for his revival inthe years after World War II when critics
were suspicious of ideological criticism from both the right and
the left. But my distinction between privacy and autonomy
complicates this commonplace reading of James I s inviolability.
Warren and Brandeis may have associated privacy with an inviolate
personality, but for James a personality is by definition prone to
violation.
Rather than establish autonomy, the failure of a character or
work of art to be identical with its ideas actually forces it into
relations of dependency. Autonomy would occur, not when there is
a discrepancy between voic'e and content, but when there is an
organic merger of the two. Indeed the failure to merge the two
makes Verena I s voice vulnerable to appropriation by others who
speak through her as a medium. There is, in fact, no better
expression of the emptiness at the core of her being than the
discrepancy between her voice and the ideas that it expresses. It
is, however, that emptiness that allows her to be both vulnerable
and seductive. So too with a novel, especially because its medium
is language, which by nature cannot be, as perhaps music can, pure
voice.
Constituted by language, a literary work possesses a voice
that is not identical to the ideas that it expresses, a discrepancy
that renders readers' efforts to reduce it to ideas a violation of
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what I have called its "privacy." At the same time, because
language would not be language unless i t expressed ideas, any
reading that attempts completely to separate a work from its ideas
is as flawed as the effort to alienate a worker's labor without
altering his self. Just as Verena and a work of art are not
identical to the ideas that they express, so a worker is not
identical to his labor. This lack of identity would seem to
indicate that ideas, like labor, are alienable from the essential
character of a person or a work of art. Verena should be able, in
other words, to enter into exchanges of ideas with Olive or Basil
that would leave her essential self untouched. But because she is
defined by a lack, rather than a pre-existing autonomy, this is
impossible. Her self is, at least partially, involved in any
exchange that she enters, just as the worker's self is, at least
partially, involved in any exchange that he makes for his labor.
This is most obvious in Verena's proposed marriage with Basil. In
marriage Verena' s character will be altered because the very
structure of the relationship established by the marriage contract
is not negotiated through a free exchange of ideas but already
dominated by ideas held by Basil.
The point is, then, not only that a discrepancy between voice
and ideas creates a dependency on relationships, but that people
and works are defined by the specific relationships that they enter
into. The ways in which Olive and Basil relate to Verena offer two
negative models for the contract between reader and text.
Possessed by Verena's voice, both Basil and Olive attempt to
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possess it. Basil's mode of possession grows out of his
recognition of gendered difference, difference defined for hirn by
a hierarchical relationship of status. Having separated the charm
of Verena's voice from what it says, Basil does not care so much
to influence i ts content, which he dismisses as moonshine. For hirn
Verena's voice is a purely formal performance. He merely wants to
reserve its performances for hirnself . In contrast, Olive, in
striving for an egalitarian union, demands a perfect merger of form
and content. That merger, however, demands a loss of difference.
As a result, her way of aChieving i t becomes in one important
respect more proprietorial than Basil's. If Basil allows Verena
her voice and dismisses its content, Olive appropriates it as a
medium to express her own ideas. Thus she is like numerous readers
who use a work of literature as a vehicle to make public their own
point of view. Basil reads Verena's voice performativelYi Olive
constitutively. For James a contract between reader and text that
will preserve a text's privacy depends upon a resistance to such
acts of possession.
In making privacy dependent upon a resistance to possession
James would seem to confirm Warren and Brandeis's claim that a
right to privacy needs to be distinguished from a right to
property. But to look at the two lawyers' effort to make that
distinction is to mark a subtle, but crucial, difference, a




It is no accident that in order to distinguish privacy from
property Warren and Brandeis turned to aseries of famous copyright
cases that often involved works of art. To be sure, to claim
copyright is to transform a work of art into a form of property
available for circulation through publication. But Warren and
Brandeis were interested in those cases that established the
artist's right to withhold publication. That right, they claimed,
establishes the precedent for a right to be left alone. They
could rely on these cases to establish a right to privacy because
of the special position that artistic creation occupies in our
culture. On the one hand, it can be alienated and become a form
of property. On the other, prior to its act of alienation, it
seems to be coextensive with the life of its creator. To attempt
to possess it without his permission is not so much the theft of
a piece of property -- its market value may be worthless -- as it
is a violation of his personal dignity, or as Warren and Brandeis
would have i t, his privacy . Thus a work of art seems to be
simultaneously a potential piece of alienable property and an
expression of its creator's innermost self.
James complicates this already complicated situation by
reminding us that an innermost self is itself the product of
relationships with others. So too a work of art, which has no life
unless it is brought into relationship with an aUdience, a
relationship that makes it vulnerable to possession. But what does
it mean to possess a work of art?
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So long as possession is seen in terms of ownership and
property, the effort to separate privacy from property remains
impossible. What it means to possess a work of art is, however,
double edged. On the one hand, someone can hold legal title to it
and copyright the earning power brought about by its pUblication.
On the other, someone with no legal claim at all can "possess" a
work through an imaginative act of appropriation. The first is
clearly within the realm of the law. The second, however, is
difficult to articulate in legal terms. Indeed, what lawyer would
claim that a reader's imaginative possession of a work is a claim
to legal ownership over it? This second form of possession does
not fit under the law of copyright.
And there is at least one more complication. Although the law
attempts to maintain a clear-cut distinction between works of
fiction and life, so that authors often proclaim their works
fictional in order to protect themselves from libel suits, works
of art with a mimetic component can themselves, as James knows,
involve an urge to appropriate life or some aspect of it. Thus for
James a work is not, as it is for Warren and Brandeis, coextensive
with its creator until he alienates it as a piece of property to
the public. Instead it is defined by a variety of relations,
although it cannotbe reduced to any one. First, there is the gap
between it and its creatori second, between it and readers that
would possess iti third, between it and the life that it would
possess. What I have been calling the "privacy" of a work of art
depends upon establishing a "space between" in at least these three
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directions. As I have shown, such privacy is not a moment of
autonomy in which a work can speak for itself. Instead, it is
constructed by maintaining aspace that keeps i t from being
dominated by the very relations that define it. It depends upon
a moment akin to that delicately balanced moment in which a self,
created through exchanges, is not effaced by them. It depends, in
other words, upon a moment like that moment of courtship in The
Bostonians when Verena, so vulnerable to being possessed by others,
maintains the power to possess her would-be possessors.
Of course, in The Bostonians that moment is not sustained.
Similarly, the spaces defining the privacy of a work of art are
always vulnerable to appropriation. Thus, although there is a
difference between Jamesian representations of the act of
possessing a self or a work of art and the legal notion of
property, James's location of privacy as a resistance to possession
still seems as doomed as Warren and Brandeis's effort securely to
distinguish privacy from property. But once again there is a
subtle distinction. Faced with the demands of legal rhetoric, the
two lawyers attempt to assign privacy and property to separate
legal compartments. But James operates in a different rhetorical
world. Relieved of the need to assign privacy to a distinct realm
er a particular entity, James makes it dependent upen a
relationship in which it is constructed by resisting that which in
part defines it. That resistance may be doomed to failure. Like
Warren and Brandeis's effort to locate privacy within the seIf,
James' s delicately balanced moment of privacy constructed by a
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"space between" may be impossible to maintain, just as a balanced
reading of a Jamesian novel (including mine) may be impossible.
Nonetheless, there is still something to be gained by striving to
achieve it.
What is gained would, however, be very difficult to translate
into the realm of the law, especially a legal system, like the one
in the united States, that works at least in part by assigning
rights. For instance, to whom would it assign a Jamesian right to
privacy, which depends upon aspace that belongs to no one person
although it is a product of human exchanges? Or, for another
example, try to determine if there would be any inevitable
application of James's notion of privacy to today's legal debates
over abortion. It would, I suggest, not fit neatly into the
rhetoric of either side.
But if it would be difficult to translate into the law what
is gained from striving to achieve a Jamesian notion of privacy,
what is lost by not doing so is revealed by a similarity, not a
difference, between James and the two lawyers. The threat to
.Warren and Brandeis ' s right to privacy today is not, as some
Mugwumps a hundred years aga feared, socialism. Instead, it is,
as the two lawyers sensed, the uncontrolled free play of the market
that would turn everything including personality into a commodity.
Similarly, the major threat to a Jamesian notion of artistic
privacy is the effort by many recent critics to subsume the notion
of the aesthetic under that of rhetoric, thus allowing them to
possess a work by assuming that its value is determined by the
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amount of persuasion it accomplishes in the marketplace of ideas.
One consequence of identifying these threats is that it does not
seem that, contrary to the hopes of same politically engaged
critics, elimination of arealm of the private or of a Jamesian
notion of the aesthetic will be a first step towards freedom from
the logic of a capitalist economy. On the contrary, for those
intent on resisting the logic of the market, aspects of the nations
of both privacy and art constructed at this time, despite certain
ideological corruptions associated with them, seem weIl worth
preserving. For proof I merely invite you to return to The
Bostonians and establish your own relationship to it, one that, I
hope, will be at least slightly affected by my own appropriations
of it in this essay.
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